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Abstract
We explore the relationships between non-bossiness and Nash im-
plementability. We provide a new domain-richness condition, weak
monotonic closedness, and prove that on weakly monotonically closed
domains, non-bossiness togetherwith individualmonotonicity is equiv-
alent to monotonicity, a necessary condition for Nash implementa-
tion. The result shows an impossibility of Nash implementation in all
economies except pure public goods economies, in the sense that it
indicates that in all economies except pure public goods economies, it
is impossible to implement bossy social choice functions inNash equi-
libria, which embody the characteristics inherent in those economies.
Keywords: Non-Bossiness, Individual Monotonicity, Monotonicity,
Weak Monotonic Closedness.
JEL Classication Numbers: D51, D71, D78.
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1 Introduction
The mechanism design literature has dealt with a very large number of
allocation rules (or direct revelation mechanisms). The following is an ex-
ample of the allocation rules in a private goods economy: an allocation rule
where there is an agent, called a boss, who can change another agent's con-
sumption bundle by changing her preferences without changing her own
bundle. This type of allocation rule was called bossy by Satterthwaite and
Sonnenschein (1981); but the idea of the bossy allocation rules had already
been known, since the well-known VickreyClarkeGroves type of alloca-
tion rules (Vickrey (1961), Clarke (1971), and Groves (1973)) were bossy. So,
bossy allocation rules can be regarded as acceptable if the VickreyClarke
Groves type of allocation rules seem attractive.
The standard economic theory tells us that agents are assumed to be
selsh. This means that bosses do not care about consumption bundles
of the other agents; so bosses will not deliberately change another agent's
consumption bundle by changing her preferences even if her own bundle is
kept unchanged. This is a key to making the VickreyClarkeGroves type
of allocation rules work well.
Nevertheless, Satterthwaite and Sonnenschein (1981) thought of bossy
allocation rules as undesirable at least in terms of simplicity (see Satterth-
waite and Sonnenschein (1981) for details). So, they introduced the notion
of non-bossiness, which requires that there should be no boss. Non-bossiness
has since been widely used in the literature on strategy-proofness.1
But, almost all of the literature has not explainednon-bossiness's reason-
ableness and desirability. Non-bossiness has often been imposed for techni-
cal convenience with the following exceptions: Barbera and Jackson (1995)
showed that non-bossiness plus strategy-proofness implies weak coali-
tional strategy-proofness in pure exchange economies, and Papai (2000a)
and Takamiya (2001) showed that non-bossiness together with strategy-
proofness is equivalent to coalitional strategy-proofness in the house allo-
cation problem and in the ShapleyScarf housing market with strict prefer-
ences, respectively. These tell us that non-bossiness is desirable in the sense
that when combined with strategy-proofness, it prevents manipulation by
coalitions of agents.
However, coalitional strategy-proofness is too demanding in general,
1A partial list of such literature includes Barbera and Jackson (1995), Ju (2004), and Ser-
izawa (2005) for pure exchange economies; Svensson (1999), Takamiya (2001), Miyagawa
(2002), and Papai (2003) for the housing market of Shapley and Scarf (1974); Miyagawa
(2001) and Svensson and Larsson (2002) for the ShapleyScarf housing market with com-
pensation; Svensson (1999), Papai (2000a), Papai (2000b), and Papai (2001) for the house
allocation problem; Schummer (2000a) and Svensson and Larsson (2002) for the house
allocation problem with compensation; Klaus (2001) for allotment economies with single-
dipped preferences; Serizawa (1996) for public good economies; and Dearden and Einolf
(2003) for excludable public good economies.
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because it prevents not only self-enforcing coalitional manipulations but
also non-self-enforcing coalitional manipulations. The standard economic
theory also tells us that in non-cooperative environments, agents can freely
discuss their actions but cannot make binding commitments. This indicates
that there is no need to rule out coalitional manipulations that are not self-
enforcing unless an additional assumption that agents can sign binding
agreements is imposed. So, when coupled with strategy-proofness, non-
bossiness appears too strong without the additional assumption.2
Thus, the issue concerning reasonableness and desirability of non-
bossiness seems still open. This paper examines the desirability of non-
bossiness by exploring the relationships between non-bossiness and Nash
implementability.3
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives notation and def-
initions. We explore the relationships between non-bossiness and Nash
implementability in Section 3. Section 4 contains a concluding remark.
2 Notation and Denitions
Let N := f1; 2; : : : ; ng be the set of agents, where 2  n < +1. Let Xi be the
consumption space for agent i 2 N, where Xi is an arbitrary non-empty set.
Let A  X1 X2     Xn be the set of feasible allocations. Given a 2 A, let ai
denote agent i's consumption bundle.
Each agent i 2 N has preferences over Xi, which are represented by a
complete and transitive binary relation Ri. The strict preference relation
associated with Ri is denoted by Pi. Let Ri denote the set of possible
preferences for agent i 2 N. A domain is denoted byR := R1 R2    Rn.
A preference prole is a list R = (R1;R2; : : : ;Rn) 2 R.
Let LCi(a;Ri) := fb 2 A j aiRibi g be agent i's lower contour set of a 2 A at
Ri 2 Ri. LetUCi(a;Ri) := fb 2 A j biRiai g be agent i's upper contour set of a 2 A
at Ri 2 Ri.
A social choice function is a single-valued function f : R ! A that assigns
a feasible allocation a 2 A to each preference prole R 2 R. Let fi denote
agent i's consumption bundle assigned by f .
Now we introduce a domain-richness condition. A domainR is weakly
monotonically closed if, for all i 2 N, allRi;R0i 2 Ri, and all a; b 2 Awith ai = bi,
there exists R¯i 2 Ri such thatLCi(a;Ri)  LCi(a; R¯i) andLCi(b;R0i )  LCi(b; R¯i).
2It might not be necessary to worry about manipulation by very large coalitions, because
it is dicult to coordinate actions of agents in such coalitions, as pointed out by Schummer
(2000b) and Serizawa (2005). So, non-bossiness together with strategy-proofness might still
seem strong, even if the additional assumption is imposed.
3In the ShapleyScarf housing market with strict preferences, Takamiya (2001) has al-
ready shown that non-bossiness has relationships to Nash implementability. In other envi-
ronments, however, the relationship of non-bossiness to Nash implementability is not yet
known.
4
Note that every rich domain in the sense of Dasgupta et al. (1979) is weakly
monotonically closed, but not vice versa. As shown by Dasgupta et al.
(1979), for example, the domain of all quasi-linear preferences over public
goods and transfers is not rich, but is weakly monotonically closed.
Next we introduce two properties of social choice functions. Non-
bossiness (Satterthwaite and Sonnenschein (1981)) requires that if an agent
changes her preferences but her consumption bundle is unchanged, then
the bundle of each agent should be unchanged.
Denition 1 (Non-Bossiness). A social choice function f satises non-
bossiness if, for all R 2 R, all i 2 N, and all R0i 2 Ri, if fi(R) = fi(R0i ;R i), then
f (R) = f (R0i ;R i).
Monotonicity (Maskin (1999)) is a necessary condition for Nash imple-
mentation.
Denition 2 (Monotonicity). A social choice function f satisesmonotonic-
ity if, for all R;R0 2 R, if LCi( f (R);Ri)  LCi( f (R);R0i ) for all i 2 N, then
f (R0) = f (R).
3 Results
In this section, we examine the relationships between non-bossiness and
Nash implementability. We begin by looking at the relationships between
non-bossiness and monotonicity.
Lemma 1. Suppose thatR is weakly monotonically closed. Then, if a social choice
function f satises monotonicity, then it satises non-bossiness.
Proof. Pick any R 2 R, any i 2 N, and any R0i 2 Ri such that fi(R) =
fi(R0i ;R i). We want to show f (R) = f (R
0
i ;R i).
Since R is weakly monotonically closed, we can choose R¯i 2 Ri such
that LCi( f (R);Ri)  LCi( f (R); R¯i) and LCi( f (R0i ;R i);R0i )  LCi( f (R0i ;R i); R¯i).
SinceLC j( f (R);R j)  LC j( f (R);R j) andLC j( f (R0i ;R i);R j)  LC j( f (R0i ;R i);R j)
for all j , i,monotonicity implies f (R¯i;R i) = f (R) and f (R¯i;R i) = f (R0i ;R i),
respectively. Thus, f (R) = f (R¯i;R i) = f (R0i ;R i). 
Lemma 1 says that monotonicity implies non-bossiness. However, non-
bossiness alone cannot imply monotonicity; but, as shown in Lemma 2 be-
low, non-bossiness together with individual monotonicity (Takamiya (2001))
can imply monotonicity.
Denition 3 (IndividualMonotonicity). Asocial choice function f satises
individual monotonicity if, for all R 2 R, all i 2 N, and all R0i 2 Ri, if
LCi( f (R);Ri)  LCi( f (R);R0i ), then fi(R0i ;R i) = fi(R).
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Remark 1. Individual monotonicity is weaker than monotonicity by de-
nition.
Lemma 2. If a social choice function f satises both non-bossiness and individual
monotonicity, then it satises monotonicity.
Proof. Pick any R;R0 2 R such that LCi( f (R);Ri)  LCi( f (R);R0i ) for all i 2 N.
We want to show f (R0) = f (R).
Step 1: f (R0i ;R i) = f (R).
SinceLCi( f (R);Ri)  LCi( f (R);R0i ), individualmonotonicity implies fi(R0i ;R i) =
fi(R). So, we have f (R0i ;R i) = f (R) by non-bossiness.
Step 2: f (R0i ;R
0
j;R i; j) = f (R
0
i ;R i).
Since f (R) = f (R0i ;R i) byStep1,wehaveLC j( f (R
0
i ;R i);R j)  LC j( f (R0i ;R i);R0j).
So, individual monotonicity implies f j(R0i ;R
0
j;R i; j) = f j(R
0
i ;R i). Therefore,
we obtain f (R0i ;R
0
j;R i; j) = f (R
0
i ;R i) by non-bossiness.
Iteration of these steps for remaining agents inN yields f (R0) = f (R). 
We are now ready to provide the result concerning the relationships be-
tween non-bossiness and monotonicity, which follows directly from Lem-
mas 1 and 2 and Remark 1.
Theorem 1. Suppose thatR is weakly monotonically closed. Then, a social choice
function satises monotonicity if and only if it satises both non-bossiness and
individual monotonicity.
Remark 2. In classical pure exchange economies with continuous, strictly
monotone, and strictly convex preferences, it is easy to show that Theorem 1
remains true if we replace monotonicity and individual monotonicity with
weak monotonicity4 and individual weak monotonicity,5 respectively. So, non-
bossiness plus individual weak monotonicity is equivalent to weak mono-
tonicity in pure exchange economies. This improves upon the well-known
result of Barbera and Jackson (1995), which states that non-bossiness to-
gether with strategy-proofness6 implies weakmonotonicity in pure exchange
economies, because individual weakmonotonicity is weaker than strategy-
proofness in pure exchange economies.
The following is a direct corollary of Theorem 1.
4A social choice function f satises weak monotonicity if, for all R 2 R, all i 2 N, and
all R0i 2 Ri, if (i) UCi( f (R);R0i )  UCi( f (R);Ri) and (ii) aiPi fi(R) for all a 2 UCi( f (R);R0i ) with
ai , fi(R), then f (R0i ;R i) = f (R).
5A social choice function f satises individual weak monotonicity if, for all R 2 R, all i 2 N,
and all R0i 2 Ri, if (i) UCi( f (R);R0i )  UCi( f (R);Ri) and (ii) aiPi fi(R) for all a 2 UCi( f (R);R0i )
with ai , fi(R), then fi(R0i ;R i) = fi(R).
6A social choice function f satises strategy-proofness if, for all R 2 R and all i 2 N, there
is no R0i 2 Ri such that fi(R0i ;R i)Pi fi(R).
6
Corollary 1 (Takamiya (2001)). In the ShapleyScarf housing market with strict
preferences (Shapley and Scarf (1974)), a social choice function satises monotonic-
ity if and only if it satises both non-bossiness and individual monotonicity.
When coupled with the well-known results of Maskin (1999), Theorem
1 leads to the following corollaries, too.
Corollary 2. Suppose that R is weakly monotonically closed. Then, if a social
choice function is Nash implementable, then it satises both non-bossiness and
individual monotonicity.
Corollary 3. Suppose that n  3. Then, if a social choice function satises
non-bossiness, individual monotonicity, and no veto power,7 then it is Nash imple-
mentable.
Corollary 2 implies that every social choice function that violates non-
bossiness or individual monotonicity is never Nash implementable, pro-
vided that R is weakly monotonically closed. So, bossy social choice func-
tions (e.g., the second-price auction (Vickrey (1961)), the pivotal mechanism
(Clarke (1971)), the inversely dictatorial rule (Zhou (1991)), etc.) are never
Nash implementable.
Corollaries 2 and 3 together indicate that non-bossiness has close re-
lationships to Nash implementability, in the sense that non-bossiness is a
necessary condition for Nash implementation and is part of the sucient
condition for Nash implementation. These relationships tell us that non-
bossiness is desirable from the point of view of Nash implementability. The
desirability of non-bossiness seems important in terms of requiring no ad-
ditional assumption, which is in contrast to the desirability mentioned in
the Introduction.
4 Conclusion
As pointed out by Satterthwaite and Sonnenschein (1981), non-bossiness is
automatically satised in pure public goods economies, i.e., in economies
with non-excludability and non-rivalness. It might show the universal-
ity of imposing non-bossiness. At the same time, however, it means that
bossiness is characteristic of economieswith excludability or rivalness, such
as private goods economies, excludable public goods economies, and the
commons. So, a negative aspect of imposing non-bossiness is that it rules
out social choice functions inherent in economies with excludability or ri-
valness to identify such economies with pure public goods economies. In
taking account of these, Corollary 2 shows an impossibility of Nash imple-
mentation in economies with excludability or rivalness, in the sense that
7A social choice function f satises no veto power if, for all R 2 R, all a 2 A, and all i 2 N,
if a jR jb j for all b 2 A and all j , i, then f (R) = a.
7
the corollary indicates that in economies with excludability or rivalness, it
is impossible to implement bossy social choice functions in Nash equilibria,
which embody the characteristics inherent in those economies.
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